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had been taken to a nearby playground at which place it collapsed
causing the injury. No one under those circumstances would attempt
to apply Section 331, yet the same justifiable facts would exist which
make Pennsylvania the only logical and just forum in which to bring
the suit. The hypothetical facts are meant only to reemphasize the
limitations of Section 331 as a statute by which personal long-arm
jurisdiction can be attained. A court is unlikely to have any success in
attempting to cure what is evidently an outmoded statute.
Although Betcher broadens Section 331, and makes it more in accord
with present due process standards it also presents a substantial ques-
tion: Should the legislature move to void the gap between a limited
long-arm provision and the present broadened range of due process?
John Tumolo
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-The Supreme Court of the
United States held that a policeman is justified in making a search
for weapons in the outer clothing of one who he reasonably suspects
is armed and dangerous, even though the policeman has no probable
cause to arrest the man he is detaining.
Terry v. State of Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
Petitioner and two other men were observed by a policeman who sus-
pected them of "casing a job, a stick-up" because of their activity in
front of a store window. The men had been walking up and down the
street in front of the store, looking in the window and conferring.
Fearing that the men were armed, the police officer confronted peti-
tioner, asked his name and, having received a mumbled answer,
patted down the outside of his clothing. The officer felt a pistol in
the pocket of petitioner's overcoat, moved him inside the store and
removed his overcoat taking the pistol out. The trial court held' and
the Supreme Court affirmed 2 that the gun was admissible as evidence
against petitioner, and, thus, that the search was not unreasonable on
the basis that the police officer had the right to search those whom he
1. See State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
2. Terry v. State of Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the
opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.
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reasonably suspected to be armed and dangerous in order to protect
himself from bodily harm.
This case presented to the Court two questions: (1) whether or not
a police officer may stop and question a person whom he regards as
suspicious; and, (2) whether or not, pursuant to such detention, the
officer may search the same person.
In attempting to answer these questions the Court rejected the no-
tion that a "stop" and a "frisk" were not activities regulated by the
Fourth Amendment, i.e., that they did not amount to such invasions
as were intended to be protected by the fourth amendment.3 The
Court stated that,
There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as "stop" and
"frisk" that such police conduct is outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a
"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Constitution.
We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the
Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime
-"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is
nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest
that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's cloth-
ing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not
a "search." '4
The Court justified the discrediting of a distinction between a "stop,"
and an "arrest" or "seizure" of the person, and between a "frisk" and
a "search" on the ground that such distinctions withdraw these activ-
ities between policeman and citizen from the tests of constitutional
validity.6 By so doing, the Court brought the questions presented by
this case into direct confrontation with the fourth amendment which
states that,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.6
3. Id. at 1877.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1878.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Thus, the right of the police officer to stop petitioner and subsequently
search him for weapons must be viewed in the light of these consti-
tutional protections.
The first question for consideration, then, was the officer's right
to stop and detain petitioner, which right should be subject to the
same restrictions as his right to "seize" petitioner when the Court's
rejection of the distinction between a stop and an arrest is considered.
The fourth amendment has been interpreted as requiring probable
cause both for the issuance of an arrest warrant and for an arrest
without a warrant.7 The Supreme Court has defined probable cause
many times and the definitions have all rested upon a reasonable
ground for the belief of guilt." Police officers in a neighborhood well-
known for narcotics activities, were held to have had no probable
cause to stop and arrest defendant of whom they had no reason to
believe that he might be violating the law, except for his presence in
the neighborhood. 9 The Court has repeatedly denied that mere suspi-
cion, or even strong reason to suspect is enough to support a warrant
for an arrest.'0 In Mallory v. United States"' the Court stated that
police officers are not warranted in arresting on mere suspicion, but
must first find probable cause. The Court has further held that when
illegal arrests have been made, i.e., those on less than probable cause,
statements made by the defendant after such an arrest, fruits of the
crime discovered by means of such statements, and statements of co-
defendants corroborating admissions of guilt made by the defendant,
are not admissible evidence against the defendant.' 2
The reluctance of the Court to lessen the requirement of probable
cause has in part remained because it has been felt that a certain degree
of specificity of information is needed to subject a person to an arrest.
The requirement of probable cause, as defined by the courts, has estab-
lished the lower exact limits of particularity and concreteness. In a
case decided by the Supreme Court in 1964"3 the Court held that police-
7. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
8. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court stated at 162 that probable
cause existed where the facts and circumstances within the policeman's knowledge and of
which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense had been or was being committed.
9. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
10. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
11. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
12. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
13. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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men who had received an anonymous tip concerning petitioner, i.e.,
his description and that he had a record, and who subsequently stopped
him, arrested him, and searched his car, finding nothing, had no prob-
able cause for arresting him and taking him back to the station house
where they found clearing slips on him.14 The Court has held, how-
ever, that a police officer who received information from a reliable
informer, and who made observations which corroborated the in-
former's information as to the particular circumstances of the crime
does have probable cause to arrest.1, Thus, the Court has consistently
held that probable cause is a prerequisite to the validity of an arrest.
The situation in the instant case, however, differed substantially
from those discussed. Here the trial court recognized that probable
cause to arrest Terry was lacking,16 and it was nowhere implied in
the instant decision that probable cause to arrest petitioner did, in
fact, exist. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did say that Officer Mc-
Fadden was justified in subjecting petitioner to being detained and
searched. Upon what grounds these acts were justified, however, re-
mained unclear. In the absence of a right to detain and question, there
was no right, obviously, to "frisk," i.e., search. Unfortunately, the Court
did not explicitly authorize the police officer to make a forcible stop
of the suspect. 17 What the Court said was that,
where a police officer observed unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is deal-
ing may be armed and presently dangerous; where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries; and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.' 8
While this statement may answer the question of when the search
will be warranted, it does not answer the initial question-upon what
grounds the officer has the right to make the initial forcible stop when
14. Id. at 97, where Mr. Justice Stewart stated that, "to hold that knowledge of either
or both of these facts constituted probable cause would be to hold that anyone with a
previous criminal record could be arrested at will."
15. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
16. See 88 S. Ct. at 1872-73 (1968).
17. Id. at 1885.
18. Id. at 1884-85.
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probable cause is absent. By not answering this question, the Court
varied with its traditional view. Traditionally under the fourth
amendment, a search can be made only upon the issuance of a search
warant, "particularly describing the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized" with one exception-a search incident to
a lawful arrest.19 Also traditionally, the lawfulness of an arrest turned
on the existence of probable cause.20 Since the existence of probable
cause was not asserted, it can probably be assumed that the Court has
constitutionally authorized a "search" as a necessary incident to such
detention.
A line of decisions adjudicated by the New York Court of Appeals
poses an alternative to what has been submitted as the Supreme Court's
resolution of the "stop and frisk" problem. Instead of meeting the
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
squarely, the New York court recognized initially2' that the police
had the duty and authority to "stop and question" a person of suspi-
cious behavior as part of their function as law enforcers. 22 The grounds
on which this stop could be made were well distinguished from the
grounds needed to make an arrest-probable cause. The stopping could
be made on a much less stringent basis. Once the stop had been given
authority and validity, the natural step was to make the frisk valid
as an incident to the lawful stop. This was easily justified upon grounds
of safety since "the answer to the policeman's question may be a
bullet. '23 Thus, the Constitutional protections applying to seizure and
search were not here applicable, since a stop was distinguished from a
seizure and a frisk from a search. In People v. Pugach24 the court
reiterated its decision that the right to frisk was lawful as an incident
to the lawful right of a policeman to stop and inquire. People v.
Peters,25 the next New York case in this line,-presented the question of
whether a statute26 embodying the principles set forth in the above
19. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1946).
20. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
21. People v. Rivera, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
978 (1965).
22. Id. at 462-63, 201 N.E.2d at 34-35.
23. Id. at 463, 201 N.E.2d at 35.
24. 255 N.Y.S.2d 833, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965).
25. 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 N.E.2d 595 (1967), afl'd, 389 U.S. 1012 (1968).
26. N.Y. CODE CaM. PROC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1968-69):
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of
the offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section
148
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two cases could be constitutional. This statute authorizes an officer to
stop and inquire on the grounds of reasonable suspicion which the
court defined as "somewhat below probable cause on the scale of abso-
lute knowledge of criminal activity. '27 While probable cause was said
to require "satisfactory grounds for believing that a crime was com-
mitted, '28 reasonable suspicion was said to require -"satisfactory grounds
for suspecting that a crime was committed. '29 (Emphasis added). The
court justified the standards of the statute on the basis that the com-
mon law had long recognized these same standards in allowing police-
men to make some encroachment on one's freedom by asking for an
explanation of one's whereabouts in order to preserve public order
and prevent crime.8 0
The formulators of the Uniform Arrest Act have come up with a
similar solution.3 1 That Act permits a police officer to stop and ques-
tion any person of whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect is armed
and dangerous. 32 The detention provided for in the Act, however,
is wholly distinguished from an arrest. Since the initial stop and deten-
tion are given validity, the subsequent search then becomes a valid
incident to protect the inquiring officer from the perils of concealed
weapons.
and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such
person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any
other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep
it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it,
if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
27. 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222, 219 N.E.2d at 599.
28. Id. at 224, 219 N.E.2d at 600.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 220-21, 219 N.E.2d at 597.
31. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VIRGINu L. REv. 315 (1942).
32. Id. at 320-25. The Uniform Arrest Act in Section 2 of the Act provides:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may
demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to
the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and in-
vestigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two
hours. Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in
any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be
released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
Section 3 of the Act provides:
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person he has stopped or
detained to question, as provided in section 2. whenever he has reasonable ground
to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the
officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the ques-
tioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may be
made for the illegal possession of the weapon.
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The practical considerations which led the Court in the instant case,
to lower the constitutional standard of probable cause in authorized
searches and seizures of the person, must be looked at in the light of
two competing interests which Mr. Chief Justice Warren presented for
consideration-(1) the interests of the policeman in combatting crime
and of society in effective law enforcement, and (2) the interest of the
individual and his right to be let alone as guaranteed by his constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 33 It is
submitted that what the Court has done in Terry was to sacrifice
some portion of the individual's freedom to be let alone in order
to assist the needs of crime prevention and law enforcement. What
has been said, in effect, is that the standard of probable cause has
proven to be too stringent to meet with the necessity of prompt
inquiry by the police into suspicious activity. Perhaps the Court has
decided that the constitutional limitation of the rights to arrest and
search have been construed so narrowly as to result in an ineffective
framework within which our law enforcement agencies have to work.
Thus, a right to make a forcible stop and a subsequent search on a
ground of "reasonable suspicion" might present a more flexible
framework.
It may be that the consequences of the instant decision will present
many problems which may prove the decision to have been improvi-
dent. The most obvious of these problems would be in the area of
police relations with minority groups. A member of a minority group
seen walking in a predominantly white neighborhood late at night
will almost inevitably be considered suspect to policemen. The op-
portunity for police harassment will be present, notwithstanding the
fact that the policemen must testify as to specific facts which warranted
their reasonable inferences. Another problem lies with the lack of
objectiveness present in the standard of reasonable suspicion. The
33. Considering the historical development of the law in this area, a new problem is
not apparent, although concern in this area has recently become more acute with the
growing fear of the consequences of lawlessness and anarchy. An English Court in 1810
stated in Lawrence v. Hedger, 128 Eng. Rep. 6, that "[w]atchmen . . . have authority at
common law to arrest and detain in prison for examination, persons walking in the
streets at night, whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there is
no proof of a felony having been committed." That there were interests in English society
which conflicted with such decisions was evidenced by Sir Matthew Hale's comments on
these decisions. He dismissed cases permitting arrests on the basis of suspicion rather than
probable cause as being contrary to the regular practice of the common law and unworthy
of consideration in the highest courts. Thus the competing interests of the individual and
his freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion and society with its desire for
combatting crime and lawlessness is not a problem peculiar to twentieth century America.
2 SuR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 586-87 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
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Court has in the past expressed fear that a standard formulated by a
police officer would not meet the requirement of objectivity necessary
to protect the citizen from unwarranted invasion. "The right of
privacy [has been] deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Power is a heady thing; and history [has shown] that the police acting
on their own cannot be trusted. 3 4
An interesting theory which brings to the fore another problem is
that with two existing standards on which an arrest may be made, the
lesser standard, by the mere fact of its convenience and easy availability
will drive the more stringent standard out of existence.3 5
In addition there is the danger that the Court's admonition
that the search incident to the authorized stop be justified by the
policeman's testimony that it was necessary for his protection and the
protection of others will be extended far beyond its purpose-that of
precaution and safety. For example, the Court never said whether the
fruits of the type of search authorized which could be admissible evi-
dence against a defendant would be limited to objects which could
have done harm or injury to the policeman or others. What this
comes to, then, is that any bulge in any pocket, may give to the police-
man an inference that that bulge is a weapon, when, in fact, it could
be a box of candy or heroin. In either case, under the standard in
this decision, a police officer would probably feel authorized to stop,
detain, and subsequently search, since the appearance of the bulge in
certain circumstances might lead the policeman to see suspicious be-
havior in activities that might otherwise be considered normal behavior
absent the bulge.
Alternatives to the Court's holding have been recommended. One
suggestion is that the police be lawfully permitted to detain, investigate
and search in the interests of law enforcement; but, that any evidence
gained from a search conducted on less than probable cause be inad-
missible as evidence against the person searched. 36 Advocates of this
theory feel that the fear for the safety of the policeman would be
minimized without sacrificing constitutional protection of the indi-
vidual. Such a resolution might be of some value since it would prob-
34. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
35. 3 CRIMINAL LAw BULLETIN 7 (1967), as cited in the Brief for Appellant at 460,
Sibron v. New York, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 219 N.E.2d 196 (1966), rev'd, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968).
36. Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 158,
166 (1966).
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ably eliminate all incentive to make an exploratory search. Two
other alternatives have also been suggested which seem to be more
suitable to maintaining the integrity of both policeman and individual
citizen. These alternatives are to improve the caliber of policemen,
and/or to increase their numerical strength and supervision .37 While
such alternatives. seem obvious and easily implemented, a second
thought will show that the problems of enacting such alternatives
are staggering when the reluctance of municipalities to direct more
funds into that particular area is considered.
Whatever alternatives are considered, accepted, or rejected, it is
submitted that what in fact has been done amounts to a redefining of
an arrest. Since the Court did not assert the existence of probable
cause for subjecting petitioner Terry to a detention, and in fact stated
that it was not present, the conclusion reached could be that the Court
has authorized a seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment on some
standard less than probable cause. To conclude otherwise could be to
deny the existence of any basis for the search of petitioner. It could
lead to the conclusion that a search could be made wholly independent
of any constitutional right to stop, detain, and question. While it can
probably be assumed that the Court did authorize petitioner's deten-
tion on less than probable cause, in his concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Harlan's admonition that this right to make a forcible stop
be explicitly stated, is well-founded since, "what is said by this Court
today will serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities
and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law
develops. ' 38 Harlan seemed to desire a more explicit statement to the
effect that the Court had given a police officer constitutional grounds
to encounter a suspect and forcibly stop and detain him if necessary,
thus paving the way for a search for weapons incidental to this de-
tention. Harlan stated that,
Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of move-
ment and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances
warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent
or investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified,
however, the officer's right to take suitable measures for his own
safety followed automatically.3 9
37. Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29 (C. Sowle ed. 1966).
38. 88 S. Ct. at 1885.
39. Id. at 1886.
152
Vol. 7: 144, 1968
Recent Decisions
If it can be assumed that what the Court has done is to equate
Harlan's concept of a "forcible stop" with an arrest or seizure of the
person, then what the Supreme Court did was to lower the standard
on which an arrest can be made. It follows logically from this that a
new definition of an arrest has been formulated-one that no longer
predicates its validity on the existence of probable cause. However, if
this is true there must be some new, additional standard upon which
to authorize an encounter such as occurred between petitioner and
the officer. The Court took the view that it would be unreasonable to
prohibit a policeman from taking steps to assure himself that he would
not be harmed by the individual of suspicious behavior whom he was
investigating. However, the standard upon which such investigation
could be made was not one which the Court could easily define. It
was to be based on particular circumstances of each case substantiated
by the officer's testimony as to particular facts which warranted his
fear. Thus, the issue was formulated as "whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger." 40 If a police officer can be
reasonably warranted in such a belief, it seems that an "arrest and
search" of the person will be justified.
It appears that the Court has rewritten a portion of constitutional
law in order to permit an arrest to be validly made on less than prob-
able cause. Once such an arrest has been given authority there is no
problem in granting the officer the right to search the person being
detained in order that he might protect himself while fulfilling his
duty of preventing crime and aiding law enforcement.
Donetta Wypiski
ZONING-PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT-Borough Council is not pre-
cluded from rezoning land in accordance with a changed comprehen-
sive plan, and the creation of a planned unit development district
permitting a mixture of uses does not vest in the planning commission
authority greater than that permitted under zoning enabling legislation.
Cheney v. Village 2 At New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81
(1968).
.40. Id. at 1883.
153
